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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL ALLEN TEMPLE, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. No. 14232 
SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden 
Utah State Prison, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from an Order of the Third District 
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Marcellus K. Snow, Judge, 
presiding. 
STATMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action seeking an extraordinary writ in the 
nature of habeas corpus challenging appellant's confinement 
by respondent at the Utah State Prison. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From an Order denying 
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, the plaintiff appeals. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the_judgment, and judgment 
in his favor as a matter of law. The specific relief sought 
is immediate release on parole status from the Utah State Prison 
or that failing, a new hearing before the Utah State Board 
of Pardons with petitioner being afforded those procedural due 
process protections afforded persons facing parole revocation, 
including the assistance of counsel. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff was originally confined at the Utah State 
Prison pursuant to a sentence of one-to-ten years for a con-
viction of grand larceny imposed by the Third Judicial District 
Court for Salt Lake County on December 1, 1969. On September 27, 
1972, he appeared before the Utah State Board of Pardons and 
was granted a parole release date of March 12, 1974. On March 
12, 197 3 he was transferred to the Odyssey House in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. On August 27, 1973 he disappeared. Charges of 
escape were filed in Salt Lake City Court in September, 1973, 
which were subsequently dismissed without appellant's knowledge 
of their existence. On June 11, 1974, appellant's whereabouts 
became known to Utah Correctional authorities as he was arrested 
and charged with escape in Texas. These charges were also 
dismissed. On January 30, 1975, he was returned to the Utah 
State Prison from Texas. On February 26, 197 5, he appeared 
-2-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
before the Utah State Board of Pardons, which rescinded the 
previously granted parole release date of March 12, 1974. 
Appellant was not provided prior written notice of this 
hearing, he was not advised of the charges against him which 
the Board of Pardons was to consider, nor the adverse evidence 
to be presented. Appellant was also not afforded a probable 
cause preliminary hearing on the charges. 
At the hearing conducted February 26, 1975, he was 
not advised that he could call witnesses or present evi-
dence on his behalf, nor was he allowed to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses and evidence. He was not 
provided or permitted the assistance of counsel nor was he 
advised of his right to consult with counsel prior to the 
hearing. Following the decision of the Board of Pardons 
to rescind the previously granted parole release date, 
appellant was at no time provided with a statement of reasons 
for the Board's decision ahd the evidence relied upon in sup-
port of that decision. It should be noted at this point 
that testimony was introduced at the hearing which placed 
in question appellant's mental condition during the entire 
period of time subsequent to his disappearance from Odyssey 
House August 27, 1973. In addition, the record reveals that 
at no time, either prior or subsequent to the rescission hearing, 
-3-
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have prison disciplinary nor state criminal proceedings been 
conducted in regards to the disappearance from Odyssey House. 
On July 31, 1975f a hearing was conducted on appellant's 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. The pleadings, memorandum, 
exhibits and transcript of the proceedings appear in the record 
on appeal. Uncontroverted testimony was offered as to the 
particulars of the rescission hearing on February 26, 1975, 
as outlined above. Subsequent to the hearing, the Honorable 
Marcellus K. Snow entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and an Order denying the writ of habeas corpus. The Order 
and Findings and Conclusions also appear in the record on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE RESCISSION OF AN UNEXECUTED PAROLE RELEASE 
DATE SUBSEQUENT TO ITS EFFECTIVE DATE IS, FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL PURPOSES, THE EQUIVALENT OF 
PAROLE OR PROBATION REVOCATION, THUS RENDERING 
THE PROCEDURES USED IN RESCINDING APPELLANT'S 
PAROLE RELEASE DATE VIOLATIVE OF STATE AND 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. 
Appellant, in having his parole release date rescinded, 
suffered a grievous loss. In Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee 
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), the doctrine was enunciated 
that due process safeguards are mandated whenever there exists 
-4-
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a possibility that a party will suffer a greivous loss as a 
result of a state action. (concurring opinion). The grievous 
loss doctrine has been subsequently supported and expanded, 
establishing that, regardless of whether the claimed interest 
is defined as a right or privilege, due process procedural 
protections must be afforded the affected person if a grievous 
loss may result from the intended state actions. Such protection 
must also be afforded in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful 
time. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), and Fuentes 
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). 
The grievous loss doctrine was first held by the United 
States Supreme Court to be applicable to prison and corrections 
matters in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), a case 
concerning revocation of parole. Morrissey held that a loss 
of parole constituted a grievous loss within the meaning of 
the previously cited cases, and therefore mandated due process 
safeguards. 
The recission of a parole release date at issue in this 
case, is a determination which represents one of the most criti-
cal decisions that could affect an individual's life or liberty, 
much as the revocation of parole. If recission occurs sub-
sequent to the effective date of an unexecuted parole release 
date, the result is properly deemed a grievous loss which would 
require due process safeguards. This follows, as a hearing 
-5-
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conducted for determination of recission of a parole release 
date subsequent to such date is in effect a parole revocation 
hearing. Thus, the two are indistinguishable for constitutional 
purposes since the hearing was held subsequent to the effective 
date of the parole release. 
The principles of Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, and Gagnon 
v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) are applicable and binding 
upon such a parole release date recission hearing. Gagnon 
concerned probation revocation which was held to be constitution-
ally indistinguishable from parole revocation for purposes' 
of due process determinations. Therefore, under Morrissey 
and Gagnon, supra, the minimum requirements of due process 
of law in rescinding an unexecuted parole release date must 
include: 
a) Written notice of alleged violations to inmate. 
b) Disclosure to inmate of evidence against him. 
c) An opportunity to be heard and to present evidence 
and introduce witnesses. 
d) The right to confront adverse witnesses and evidence. 
e) A neutral and detached hearing body. 
f) A written statement by factfinders provided to the 
inmate giving the evidence relied on and reasons 
for rescinding the unexecuted parole release date. 
g) A preliminary hearing to determine whether probable 
cause exists to believe that a violation of the 
parole release agreement occurred. 
h) That such aforementioned opportunity to be heard 
must occur within a reasonable time subsequent 
to the unexecuted parole release date. 
i) That if assistance of counsel is requested and de-
nied, the grounds for such denial must be stated in 
the record and provided to the inmate. 
-6-
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In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit has previously ordered in a case arising in Utah 
that a parolee facing possible revocation of his or her parole 
status is entitled to appointed counsel. Alvarez v. Turner, 
422 F.2d 214 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. den., 399 U.S. 916, ex-
plained in 478 F.2d 291, 293. 
These safeguards are necessary and constitutionally 
mandated in this case because the rescission by the Board of 
Pardons of an unexecuted parole release date after its effective 
date is, in essence a parole revocation proceeding. 
As the record below indicates, none of the procedural 
protections outlined above were provided to appellant prior 
to or at the hearing at which the unexecuted release date was " 
rescinded (see Transcript of Habeas Corpus hearing, July 31, 
1975, pages 15-16, 19f 23, 26-27, 37, 39-40). The nonconform-
ity with constitutionally mandated procedural due process stand-
ards was thus substantial. 
In response to the noticable lack of procedural protections 
in this case, respondant has argued 1) that the 18-month delay 
in conducting the rescission hearing was self-induced by peti-
tioner and 2) that the rescission of the unexecuted parole 
release date was based upon appellant's "escapee" status. 
As to the hearing, appellant's disappearance did not have any 
significant effect upon the failure of the Board of Pardons 
to rescind his unexecuted parole release date within a meaning-
ful time and in a meaningful manner. No reason has been advanced 
-7-
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why the release date could not have been rescinded promptly 
after the alleged disappearance of appellant. Respondent attempts 
to justify the denial of procedural due process standards at 
the hearing which was eventually conducted February 20, 1975 
with the argument that Morrissey and Gagnon, supra, do not 
apply to rescission hearings. Yet the facts and circumstances 
of this case indicate that the hearing conducted was, in effect, 
a parole revocation hearing, differing only in that it was 
labeled a rescission hearing. This distinction between revo-
cation and rescission was expressly rejected in Lepre v. Butler, 
394 F. Supp. 185 (E.D. Pa. 1975): 
The terminology of "revocation" or "rescision" 
is to me of little consequence when considering 
possible constitutional violations. What is 
important is the operative fact situation. 
Id, at 187, Fn.l. 
The court in that case held that the rescission of a parole 
release date constituted a grievous loss, and that the inmate 
was therefore entitled to substantial procedural protections 
at the rescission hearing. 
As to the basis of the rescission, "escapee" status 
cannot be used as a justification where there has been no find-
ing of escape. As the record indicates, there has never been 
a finding of escape, either in criminal proceedings or in cor-
rectional disciplinary proceedings. Furthermore, the condition 
of the parole grant given petitioner was that a violation of 
-8-
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prison rules and regulations could provide the basis for res-
cinding the grant. To use "escapee status" as a justification 
for rescission where there has been no finding of escape raises 
serious due process questions. This is especially true in 
this case in light of the evidence offered-both at the res-
cission hearing and at the habeas corpus hearing below-of ap-
pellant's mental condition during the period from August, 1973 
through January, 197 5. Such condition certainly raises question 
about the mens rea element of "escape" and was thus a conclusion 
without a finding. (See Transcript of Habeas Corpus hearing, 
July 31, 197 5, pages 9-10, 14, 23, 38). 
Because the February 26, 1975 Board of Pardons hearing 
was, for all practical purposes, a parole revocation hearing 
in which appellant was denied essential constitutional pro-
tections, the trial court below erred as a matter of law in 
denying appellant's petition. The Order should be vacated and 
the trial court directed by- this court to grant the relief 
requested by appellant. 
POINT II. EVEN IF NOT CONSIDERED THE EQUIVALENT OF PAROLE 
OR PROBATION REVOCATION, THE PROCEDURES USED IN 
. RESCINDING APPELLANT'S PAROLE RELEASE DATE WERE 
VIOLATIVE OF STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. 
Subsequent case law interpreting Morrissey and Gagnon, 
supra, supports the application of essentially the same due 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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process standards to proceedings involving rescission of an 
unexecuted parole release date as have been mandated for parole 
or probation revocation hearings. It has been held that the 
rescission of an unexecuted grant of parole resulted in a grie-
vous loss within the meaning of: Morrissey, and that the due 
process requirements of Morrissey were therefore applicable 
with the exception of the preliminary hearing. In re Prewitt, 
105 Cal. Rptr. 318, 503 P.2d 1326 (1972), and Means v. Wainwright, 
299 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1974, U.S. Cert, den., 419 U.S. 1116). 
At least one court has gone a step further, holding that the 
preliminary hearing requirement of Morrissey must also be afforded 
prior to a formal rescission hearing. Monohan v. Burdman, 
84 Wash. 2d 922, 530 P.2d 334 (1975). Other courts have found 
that rescission of a parole release date although not of the 
magnitude of loss of actual parole, constitutes a grievous 
loss, and that due process standards must still be met although 
of a lesser degree than Morrissey requires. Lepre v. Butler, 
supra; Karger v. Sigler, 384 F. Supp. 10 (D.Mass. 1974); 
Jackson v. Wise, 390 F. Supp. 19 (CD. Calif. 1975); and Godfrey 
v. Preiser, 80 Misc. 2d 361, 363N.Y.S.2d 463 (1975). 
The case most similar in fact and in principle to the 
case at bar is Batchelder v. Kenton, 383 F.Supp. 299 (CD. 
Calif. 1974), in which the plaintiff's parole release date 
had been rescinded subsequent to its effective date. The court 
ruled that the same due process requirements applied to a future 
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parole release date as did to normal parole revocation. The 
court also stated that the inmate should have been afforded 
an adequate opportunity to confront and cross-examine his ac-
cusers and be provided with the assistance of counsel. Other 
cases holding that the assistance of counsel is required at 
rescission hearings are Godfrey v. Preiser/ supra, in which 
the right to counsel was found to be absolute, and Gee v. Brown, 
120 Cal. Rptr. 876, 534, P.2d 716 (1975), opinion as modified 
on denial of rehearing, 122 Cal Rptr. 231, 536 P.2d 1017 (1975), 
in which the right to counsel was found to be conditional pursuant 
to the Gagnon standard for determining the necessity for assis-
tance of counsel. Cf. Williams v. United States Board of Parole, 
383 F. Supp. 402 (D. Conn. 1974). 
The record below indicates that virtually none of the 
outlined procedural protections of Morrissey and Gagnon, supra, 
were afforded to appellant at the rescission hearing. (See 
Transcript of Habeas Corpus hearing, July 31, 197 5, Pgs. 15-16, 
19, 23, 26-27, 37, 39-40). Regardless of whether the rescission 
hearing in this case constituted the equivalent of a parole 
or probation revocation proceeding, minimal due process stand-
ards which were not afforded to appellant are mandated even 
in the case of rescission. 
Indeed, numerous courts have ordered procedural safe-
guards to be implemented for hearings held by parole authorities 
at which the mere question of granting a parole release date 
-11-
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to a prisoner is considered. Although less substantial in most 
cases than those protections ordered in Morrissey and Gagnon, 
supra, the following cases have resulted in procedural safe-
guards being ordered which exceed those afforded appellant 
herein notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiffs in those 
cases faced a much less immediate and less severe form of de-
privation at the hands of the parole authority. Bradford v. 
Weinstein, 519 F.2d 728 4th Cir. (1974), cert, granted, 95 S.ct. 
2394, Childs v. United States Board of Parole, 511 F.2d 1270 
(D.C. Cir. 1974), United States ex rel Johnson v. Chairman of 
New York State Board of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2nd Cir. 1974, 
judg. vac. as moot, 42 L. Ed. 2d 289), Franklin v. Shields, 
399 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Va. 1975), and dimming s v. Regan, 45 A.D. 
2d 222, 357 N.Y.S. 2d 260 (1974). 
The United States Supreme Court in Wolff v. McDonnell, 
418 U.S. 539 (1974), decided what procedural protections must 
be afforded to inmates at prison disciplinary hearings at which 
"good time" credits could be revoked. Although the court declined 
to fully extend the Morrissey and Gagnon standards to discipli-
nary proceedings, it held that due process requires that written 
notice of the charges be given to the inmate prior to the hearing, 
that at the hearing the inmate should be allowed to call witnesses 
and present documentary evidence on his behalf and that the 
inmate be provided a written statement by the fact-finders as 
to the evidence relied upon and reasons for any disciplinary 
-12-
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action. Though the court declined to rule that assistance 
of counsel was required, it specifically noted that where the 
inmate is illiterate or where the issues are too complex for 
the inmate to effectively represent himself, a counsel substitute 
should be provided. This is especially significant where the 
mental condition of the inmate is in question, as in the instant 
case. 
Respondent has argued, and the Conclusions of Law, para-
graph 3, provide, that the Morrissey and Gagnon due process 
guidelines are inapplicable to rescission of parole release 
date hearings. To reject all of the procedural protections 
of Morrissey and Gagnon in the face of the guidelines of Wolff 
v. McDonell, supra, is simply untenable. Two cases, Karger v. 
Sigler, supra, and Jackson v. Wise, supra, held that the pro-
cedural safeguards of Wolff v. McDonell are applicable at res-
cission hearings. In comparing rescission hearings to dis-
ciplinary proceedings, the court in Karger v. Sigler, supra, 
noted that: 
[t]he rescission of a decision to grant parole 
on a set date certainly works a more immediate 
change in the conditions of a prisoner's liberty 
than the loss of good time, and is entitled by 
the due process clause to at least some pro-
cedural protections appropriate under the cir-
cumstances. This decision is not based on a 
determination that parole begins at any par-
ticular point in the process, but on the prin-
ciple that parole is so important to any 
prisoner that actions depriving him of even 
a future parole once granted work a grievous 
loss upon the prisoner. Id, at 12-13. 
-13-
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By failing to provide appellant with even the minimal due pro-
cess standards applicable to disciplinary proceedings, the 
rescission of the parole release date constituted a denial 
of due process of law. On this basis, the decision of the 
trial court should be vacated and the case remanded with in-
structions from this court consistent with its opinion. 
POINT III. APPELLANT'S PAROLE RELEASE DATE COULD NOT 
' ,BE RESCINDED SUBSEQUENT TO THE EFFECTIVE 
DATE OF SUCH RELEASE CONSISTENT WITH THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE PAROLE GRANT OR WITH 
STATE AND FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS. 
As stated in the facts, appellant's parole release date 
was not rescinded until February 26, 197 5. The rescission 
thus occurred nine months subsequent to discovery by Utah authori-
ties of appellant's whereabouts in Texas, over 11 months after 
the effective date of his release on parole, 17 months after 
being formally charged with escape in Utah, and 18 months after 
his disappearance. This delay was unreasonable, and upon the 
passage of the March 12, 1974, effective date of release, the 
authority of the Board of Pardons to rescind the date terminated. 
The language of the parole grant provided: 
[t]hat if and in the event you are guilty 
of any infraction of the rules and reg-
ulations of the Utah State Prison or if 
you shall fail or refuse to perform your 
assigned duties within the Utah State 
Prison prior to the date of your release 
then (emphasis added) 
-1A-
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the release date may be rescinded. Thusr a two-pronged test 
must be met in order to rescind a parole release date. First, 
one has to either be guilty of an infraction or not perform 
assigned duties. In this case, appellant has allegedly commit-
ted the infraction of escape, but since there has been no showing 
of guilt by a finding of escape, guilt has not been proven 
by any standard. Moreover, since appellant was not an inmate 
at the Utah State Prison at the time of his alleged disappearance, 
he did not have any duties which he could fail or refuse to 
perform. Thus neither facet of the first prong of the test 
is met. Second, the guilt of infraction or nonperformance 
of duties must be established prior to the date of release. 
In this case guilt has not been shown at any time, and anything 
concerning the alleged disappearance which was revealed at 
the rescission hearing came subsequent to the date of release 
and beyond the scope of authority of the Board of Pardons as 
set out in the grant of parole. Once the effective date of 
parole release passed it could not be rescinded, even though 
it passed unexecuted. This is not to say that the correctional 
authorities were without means to attempt to secure the return 
of appellant to prison. Appellant's return to the Utah State 
Prison could have been effectuated through a parole revocation 
proceeding with its added procedural safeguards, thus bringing 
the hearing up to minimal constitutional standards. Again, 
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this court should reverse the trial courtfs order denying 
appellant's petition. 
POINT IV. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD BELOW, CON-
STITUTING REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE JUDGMENT 
DENYING APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
HABEAS CORPUS. 
Subsequent to the habeas corpus hearing conducted below 
on July 31, 1975, the respondent prepared Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law which were signed by the Court September 
8, 1975. They provided in part, that: 
1) The rescission of the parole release date was 
based upon the ground that appellant had been 
an escapee at the time of the effective date 
of his parole (Findings of Fact, paragraph 6); 
2) The rescission of appellant's parole release 
date by the Board of Pardons was proper and in 
accordance with law (Findings of Fact, para-
graph 13) ; 
3) The rescission was proper and in accordance 
with law and did not deprive appellant of his 
constitutional right to due process of law in 
that Morrissey and Gag no n, supra, are incippli-
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cable to rescission of parole release date 
hearings and appellant self-induced the delay 
of the rescission hearing by being on escapee 
status when his parole date came due (Conclu-
sions of Law, paragraph 3); 
4) There have been no errors or infringements of 
appellant's constitutional rights because 
appellant pleaded guilty at the parole res-
cission hearing (Conclusions of Law, para-
graph 4) ; 
5) Appellant's incarceration is legal (Conclu-
sions of Law, paragraph 5). 
None of the foregoing findings or conclusions is supported 
by the record. 
As to point 1, the reasons for the rescission do not 
appear in the record. Further, there was uncontroverted test-
imony that appellant was never provided with reasons for the 
rescission (Transcript, page 16, In. 16-19; page 23, In. 3-7) 
and that there was no finding of escape presented to the Board 
of Pardons to support rescission on the grounds of escape (Trans-
cript page 28, In. 13-15). 
As to the second, third and fifth points going to the 
legality of the rescission, uncontroverted testimony appears 
in the record showing that appellant 1) had no prior notice 
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of the rescission hearing nor was he advised of the charges, 
(Transcript, p. 15, In. 3-8; p. 23, In. 14-21; p. 26, In. 30 
to p. 27, In. 9; p. 37, In. 7-17; p. 39, In. 24-30; p. 40, 
In. 22-24); and 2) appellant was not allowed to introduce wit-
nesses on his behalf, to have assistance of counsel, to the 
right of confrontation, nor was he advised of these rights 
and the right to introduce evidence on his behalf (Transcript, 
p. 15, In. 20 to p. 16, In. 5; 16, In. 12-15; p. 19, In. 1-10; 
p. 23, In. 22-24, p. 27 In. 10-30; p. 40, In. 1-7, 8-12, and 
25-29). The Findings also ignored uncontroverted testimony 
placing in question the mental condition of appellant at the 
time of the rescission hearing. (Transcript p. 14, In. 14-28; 
p. 23, In. 25-30; p. 28, In. 20 to p. 29, In. 10). In addition, 
the Board of Pardons did not provide appellant with a statement 
of reasons for the rescission and the evidence relied upon, 
nor were reasons given for denying assistance of counsel (Trans-
cript, p. 16, In. 6-11 and 16-19; p. 23, In. 3-7). Uncontro-
verted testimony was offered at the habeas corpus proceeding 
indicating that a preliminary hearing to determine probable 
cause for rescission was not conducted (Transcript, p. 15, 
In. 9-14) and that no disciplinary or criminal proceedings 
were taken against appellant concerning his alleged disappear-
ance (Transcript, p. 16, In. 20-21). Yet the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law state that the rescission was "proper", 
"in accordance with law", did not deprive appellant of consti-
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tutional rights to due process of law and that appellant's 
incarceration is legal. 
As to the remainder of the third point, Morrissey and 
Gagnon, supraf do apply to rescission hearing under the facts 
and circumstances of this case either directly (Argument, 
Point I) or in principle (Argument Point II). Also, as is 
argued in Point I, the alleged disappearance of appellant is 
not significant in assessing the 18-month delay in conducting 
the rescission hearing. Further, since there has been no finding 
of escape, serious due process of law problems are presented 
here where escape is offered to justify rescission and counter-
balance appellant's contention of a denial of due process pro-
cedural protections. Thus, the conclusions of "self-induced 
delay" and "escapee status" are unsupported. 
As to the fourth point, it is implied in the Conclusion 
that the appellant pleaded guilty to escape. Although testi-
mony was offered by witness Cannon that the appellant did plead 
guilty, Cannon later retracted that testimony and stated that 
he was not sure if appellant in fact plead guilty to escape 
(Transcript, p. 38, In. 12 to p. 39, In. 2). At no time has 
appellant plead guilty to escape, nor does it appear so any-
where in the record. Thus it would be clear error to justify 
the rescission of the unexecuted parole release date on the 
basis of a guilty plea to escape. 
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Moreover, appellant's mental competence was questionable 
at the time of his disappearance from Odyssey House thus ren-
dering very questionable the mens rea element of escape. With-
out the assistance of counsel at the rescission hearing or 
even the knowledge that he could consult counsel, appellant 
was not in a position to even enter a knowing and voluntary 
plea. 
Because of these errors, the Court should reverse the 
Order of the Court below. 
CONCLUSION " 
Appellant's brief can be summarized as follows: 
First, the procedures used in rescinding appellant's 
unexecuted parole release date did not conform with due process 
standards for parole or probation revocation. Since the res-
cission occurred after the effective date of release, it was 
in effect a parole revocation hearing. Thus, the procedural 
protections afforded appellant at the rescission hearing were 
insufficient to satisfy due process of the law under the Con-
stitution of Utah and United States Constitution, rendering 
v 
the rescission void. 
Second, even if the procedural protections to be afforded 
at rescission hearings are less than in parole or probation 
revocation, the rescission of an unexecuted parole release 
date results in a grievous loss and is thus deserving of sub-
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stantial procedural safeguards• The procedural protections 
afforded appellant at the rescission hearing were not substan-
tial and thus failed to satisfy due process of law under the 
Constitution of Utah and the United States Constitution, ren-
dering the rescission void. 
Third, the parole grant itself provided that the parole 
release date could be rescinded only prior to the effective date 
of release* Thus the rescission subsequent to the effective 
date was beyond the scope of the authority in the parole grant 
and denied appellant due process of law under the Constitution 
of Utah and United States Constitution, rendering the rescission 
void. 
Fourth, uncontroverted testimony and evidence demonstrate 
that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are not sup-
ported by the record below. This constitutes both reversible 
error and denial of due process of law under the Constitution 
of Utah and the United States Constitution, rendering void 
both the trial court's decision and the rescission of appellant's 
parole release date. 
The Order of the court below should be reversed and 
relief granted to appellant as deemed just and proper. 
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of January, 197 6. 
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